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-Introduction
The Dotcom bubble and the concomitant high underpricing are two puzzles. From 2,000 points in the beginning of 1999, the NASDAQ composite index escalated to 5,048 in March 2000, returning to near the 2,000 points after 2000. The average underpricing escalated from 14.3 percent in the 1991-1998 period to 64.9 percent in 1999 64.9 percent in -2000 64.9 percent in (Ritter, 2014 . This article presents a rational explanation connecting these two phenomena. We conjecture that the large inflow of IPOs of fast growing firms affected the expectation about the long-term growth rate of New Economy firms and consequently, their evaluation, feeding the price spiral. The high underpricing originated from the strategic behavior of some issuers for which the continued use of capital market was a need: the possible overvaluation of their shares forced them to highly underprice their IPOs.
The birth of the Internet spurred a variety of new products and processes (the so-called New Economy). The Internet also changed the structure of many traditional businesses. For example, it allowed for improved inventory management and new manners of marketing products, stimulating market consolidation in some traditional industries. It even allowed some local businesses to become global (e.g., Amazon.com). The use of new processes even raised doubt on whether these new businesses would subsume traditional ones. Such business revolution fostered a large cohort of new firms in a race for leadership (or survivorship). These firms needed to go public either to raise cash to fund organic growth, or to turn their shares into currency to pay for acquisitions.
1 Thus, for them the continued use of the capital markets was important. New Economy firms also presented abnormal realized growth rate, but their track record was short because they were young. Short track record along with uncertainty about the effectiveness the new processes made difficult the assessment of long-term growth rates (Schwert 2002; Schultz and Zaman, 2001 ).
We conjecture that information on long-term growth rate coming from the IPO market fed the price spiral. The stock of public New Economy firms was small and the flow of IPOs was 3 large. Thus, the IPO market became relevant to assess the long-term growth rate of the whole industry. The continued flow of highly underpriced high-growth firms lead investors to update upwards their estimation of the long-term growth rate, causing upward price revision for the whole industry. Therefore, the increase in price was a rational.
Our explanation for the abnormal underpricing builds on the behavior of firms with the need for continued use of capital markets. Such firms, facing the frenzy for their shares, had reasons to be conservative in the pricing of their IPO. First, the continued use of the stock market requires good shares performance (e.g., good price returns, regular analyst coverage and low bidask spreads). Overvalued shares could lose their attractiveness if a market reversion occurred.
Second, race for leadership required large pre-IPO capital infusion, lowering CEO's ownership.
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Maintenance of control with small ownership requires good shares dilution, 3 preferentially among buy-and-hold investors (e.g., small number of shares floating makes difficult for threatening investors to acquire significant ownership). However, underwriters would hardly place potentially overpriced shares among their premier buy-and-hold investors. Third, for an issuer intending to do a series of acquisitions, ownership dilution could come mostly from expensive acquisitions, rather than from IPO underpricing. By selling overvalued shares at their IPOs, strategic acquirers could create unrealistic expectations for acquisition multiples, making acquisitions expensive. Last, venture capital (VC) sponsored firms could want to protect VCs ability to tackle underwriters, auditors, analyst and investors (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) .
We present evidence supporting our conjectures. First, we show that during the bubble the flow of IPOs of fast growing firms explains returns on the NASDAQ composite index. Next, we show that the abnormally high underpricing can be fully accounted by issuers' strategic purposes.
2 Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) report that average CEO ownership dropped from 23 percent during 1996-1998 dropped to 17.3 percent in 1999 and to 11.6 percent in 2000.
3 Brennan and Franks (1997) find that when shares are placed more widely rather than placed with just a few powerful large shareholders, the entrepreneur is less easy ousted from the company.
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For robustness purposes, we also investigated other conjectures on the origin of the bubble's underpricing. Following Loughran and Ritter (2004) , there are three alternative conjectures: 1) Change in Risk Composition (Helwege and Liang, 2004; Howe and Zhang, 2005; Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Lowry and Schwert, 2002; Ritter 1984; and Yung, Colak, and Wang, 2008) : changing in average underpricing over time reflects change in the riskiness of the IPOs. The main evidence supporting this hypothesis for the Dotcom period is the increased failure rate in three and five years from the IPO (Yung, Colak, and Wang, 2008 underwriters that usually force high underpricing co-opted firms' insiders by allocating to them stocks in highly underpriced IPOs. These two conjectures are not consistent with the fact that abnormal underpricing is fully explained by firms' strategic behavior rather than top underwriting.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our hypotheses and methodology;
Section 3 describes our data, sample and variables; Section 4 presents our results; and Section 5 concludes.
-Hypotheses and methodology
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-Hypotheses
We conjecture that the large inflow of high-growth IPOs influenced the expectation about the growth rate of whole New Economy feeding the price spiral. We motivate this conjecture with the following simple model:
Suppose that a technology could induce high growth, g H , or low growth rates, g L (g H > g L ).
Investors a priori do not know the technology growth rate. The ex-ante probability of highgrowth is given by   (0,1). As in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) we assume that during the book-building, institutional investors provide information about the firm that becomes public and common knowledge after the IPO. In particular, we assume that the information gathering process generates a signal about the quality of the technology. Signals can be good (G) or bad (B) . If the growth rate is g H , the probability of a good signal is . If the technology is low growth, the probability of a good signal is ( > ). After every IPO, the growth rate for all the firms using the same technology is updated using Bayes' rule:
To keep argument simple, let us assume that stocks are valued using the Gordon's Constant Growth Model. Let be the cost of capital and assume that agents are risk-neutral. Then, after each successful IPO, the expected value of the share is given by:
Before the signal was issued, the expected share value was given by:
Consequently, the expected change in price after a good signal is revealed is given by:
where the first term indicates the shift in probability from low to high growth and the second term indicates the net gain in valuation by moving towards a high-growth stock. If the signals are not perfectly correlated, the market valuation of all firms using that technology increases with the number of positive signals. Moreover, the higher the difference between and the bigger the appreciation following a good signal.
It is natural that IPO of firms with historical high sales growth are the candidates to generate good signals about the new technology. The good signal coming from the IPO market is that investors estimate that the historical sales growth is projected into the future. The high underpricing indicates that the growth rate that investors estimate is higher than the one used by underwriters in the in the IPO valuation. Thus, if high sales growth IPO are associated to high underpricing (as we will see later on) our first hypothesis can be stated as: With respect to underpricing, we conjecture that the possibility of overvaluation led firms that needed the continued use of capital markets (and thus, could not risk distributing overvalued shares) to highly underprice their IPOs. Thus, underpricing was a consequence of their strategic goals:
Hypothesis 2: The high underpricing prevailing during the bubble can be fully accounted by issuers' strategy. capital in IPOs and its concern with reputation has already been extensively discussed (Barry et al. 1990; and Megginson and Weiss, 1991) .
-Methodology
-Variables
-Econometric models
Hypothesis 1 states that the returns on the NASDAQ composite index responded to the inflow of high-growth IPOs. To measure this correlation one must control for high-frequency macroeconomic shocks. Fortunately, the bubble was mostly restricted to NASDAQ, both in terms of price spiral and IPO flow, barely affecting the New York Stock Exchange index (NYSE). 4 Thus, we use the NYSE index returns to control for high-frequency macroeconomic shocks. Hence, our econometric models to test Hypothesis 1 are:
and
where ∆ is the percent change in the market index in period ; # _ is the number of IPOs with low underpricing in period ; # _ ℎ is the number of IPOs with high underpricing in period ; and # is the number of IPOs in period . 8 We estimate Equations 1 and 2 using both weekly and three-week rolling returns. In the latter case, we use index returns over three weeks and the number (or proportion) of highly underpriced IPOs over the same three weeks as a moving sum of returns and IPOs. Estimations come from least squares regressions with Newey-West (12 lags) standard errors (Newey and West, 1987) .
Robustness:
One may be concerned with reverse causality in Models 1 and 2. Accordingly, high market returns could force high underpricing, increasing the number of highly underpriced IPOs.
We address this concern in two ways. First, we replace the number and proportion of highly (lowly) underpriced IPOs by the number and proportion of IPOs of high (low) sales growth issuers. Sales growth is highly correlated to underpricing (Table 5) , completely predetermined, and hardly correlated to market returns at the time of the IPO. Second, we estimate predicted underpricing and use it to classify IPOs into either highly or lowly underpriced. To predict underpricing we run a least square regression with robust errors on an estimation window and use the estimated parameters to project underpricing over the entire sample period. The econometric model is:
where is a vector of issue i's characteristics, including: dummy variables indicating VCsponsorship and Big-four auditing, sales growth, technology, age, firm size, offer size, offerto-firm size, and the size of the price interval scaled by its middle point.
One should note that, in order to avoid any by-construction correlation with market returns, our model does not include variables that could be related to the timing of the IPO (exante demand, top underwriting dummy and quarter dummies). We use two estimation windows: the whole sample period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) 5 and the pre-bubble period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) . Based on predicted underpricing, we classify firms as highly underpriced using several cut-offs (when one 9 uses the pre-bubble period as estimation window, predicted underpricing during the bubble is unsurprisingly low).
Hypothesis 2 states that the high underpricing prevailing during the bubble can be fully accounted by the characteristics and strategic goals of issuers. To test this hypothesis, we run underpricing regressions controlling for the issues' characteristics, issuers' strategic characteristics, and underwriting. Our econometric model is:
where is a vector of characteristics of issue : technology, age, offer size, firm size, offer-tofirm size, sales growth and the size of the price interval scaled by its middle point; is a set of three dummy variables indicating pre-IPO acquisitions, Big-four auditing ( _ ) and VC-sponsorship; and is a dummy variable indicating that the Carter-Manaster reputation index is above 8.
In our basic setting, we do not control for the ex-ante demand for the IPO (price revision up and price revision down) because it can be related to the underwriter's selling effort and to the IPO timing. Nevertheless, we also present estimations controlling for ex-ante demand for robustness purposes.
If Hypothesis 2 is correct, interactions of the bubble dummy with our proxies for strategic goals (Acquisitions pre-IPO, Big-four and Venture Capital) fully explain the abnormal underpricing observed during the bubble; i.e., the coefficients on the bubble dummy and its interaction with top underwriting will not be statistically significant.
We then move to discuss our robustness checks by considering the alternative scenarios proposed by the literature. In order to investigate the change in risk composition we use means comparison of the average quality of the bubble and pre-bubble IPO cohorts. Our quality 10 measure is the frequency of failures. Our indirect measures are: institutional ownership 6 and its concentration, certification by reputable underwriters and auditors, and enhanced tradability conditions (analysts' coverage and bid-ask spreads). We measure tradability conditions and institutional ownership at the end of the second year from the IPO. This allows for the effect of underwriter efforts at the IPO to wear out.
There are two objections to the use of top underwriting and analysts' coverage as quality measures during the bubble, which are related to our other robustness tests. First, Loughran and
Ritter (2004) suggest that top underwriters increased market share by lowering their standards (we call this Underwriters' Opportunistic Behavior). If so, top underwriting would not signal quality. Second, the same authors conjecture that during the bubble, firms coped with underwriters with a reputation for severe underprice in exchange for analyst coverage (Analyst Lust). Therefore analysts' coverage was related to underpricing and underwriting rather than issuer quality. We test these two conjectures using probit analysis on the choices of underwriters and analyst coverage. Our specification for these tests is:
where is either a dummy variable indicating Carter-Manaster index for underwriters' reputation above 8, or a dummy variable indicating analysts' coverage during the second year from the IPO; is a dummy variable indicating the bubble years (1999) (2000) ; is a vector of predetermined characteristics of issue : VC-sponsorship, Big-four auditing, high-growth, pre-IPO acquisition, age, technology, firm size, offer size, offerto-firm size and sales growth (in the analysis for analysts' coverage we also include underpricing, the top-underwriting dummy and their interactions with the bubble dummy); and is a set of 9 industry dummies. 
-Data and sample
Our dataset combines data from several sources. From Securities Data Corporation (SDC-Platinum) we obtained an exhaustive list of IPOs and information on offer price, offer date, proceeds, leading underwriter, price interval, issuer age and seasoned equity offerings (SEO). We complemented and corrected SDC-Platinum database following suggestions in Jay Ritter's website (Ritter, 2014) . From Compustat we obtained data on quarterly and annual fundamentals: sales, book value of assets, and Big-Four auditing. Information on VC-sponsoring comes from Venture Economics database. Analysts' coverage comes from the I/B/E/S database.
Data on institutional ownership and its Herfindahl index comes from Thomson Reuters
Institutional Holdings (13F). As measure of underwriter quality we use the Carter and Manaster index (1990) updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004) . Information on bid-ask spreads, delisting due to bankruptcy, mergers and drops, and daily quotation for NYSE and NASDAQ composite indices come from the CRSP-US. We use Loughran and Ritter's (2004) classification to identify High-tech firms. We define three periods: Pre-bubble (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , Transition (1997 and 1998) and Bubble (1999 and 2000) . During the pre-bubble period our sample has a higher proportion of technology firms, but during the transition and bubble periods, that proportion is significantly lower.
-Change in IPO characteristics
Table 4 (Panel A) reports issuers' characteristics in three distinct periods pre-bubble (1991-1996) transition (1997 and 1998) and bubble (1999-2000) . It also compares pre-bubble to bubble periods. Panel A describes the entire sample while Panel B only the subsample of highgrowth firms. Pre-IPO sales growth -measured by the average quarterly growth (over the previous three quarters) -increased significantly during the bubble, from 56 to 91 percent. To classify firms into high-growth we used the cutoff for the highest quartile of the pre-bubble subsample (81 percent). Thus the proportion of high-growth firms increased from 25 percent in the pre-bubble period to 36 percent in the transition period and 57 percent during the bubble.
The general message of Table 4 is that IPO characteristics changed from the pre-bubble to the bubble period due to not only an increase in the proportion of high-growth issuers but also a change in the characteristics high-growth IPOs. From the pre-bubble to the bubble period, firm age declined from 14.6 to 9.4 years. In the high growth subsample such decline was from 9.85 to 6.55 years. Thus, high growth firms during the bubble were very young. The fraction of IPO from technology firms increased from 29 to 50 percent, similar change was occurred among high growth firms: from 34 to 55 percent; firm size (measured by book value of assets) increased from $164 to $255 mi. Among high growth firms size almost tree folded: from $90 to $230 mi; offer size increased from $58 million to $116 million. Among high growth firms offer size increased from $53 million to $107 million; underpricing increased from 16 to 66 percent. The increase was more pronounced for high-growth firms: from 23 to 78 percent; top underwriting increased from 68 to 84 percent but among high-growth firms the increase was lower: from 76 to 85 percent; VC backing increased from 41 to 67 percent. In the high-growth subsample, the increase was from 55 to 75 percent; there was no sizable change in Big-four auditing: an increase of 3 to 13 4 percent in both samples; and a decrease on pre-IPO acquisitions from 33 to 25 percent in the whole sample and from 31 to 27 percent among high-growth firms.
One condition embedded in our Hypothesis 1 is that high growth IPOs were highly underpriced during the bubble. In Table 4 we have seen that underpricing was significantly higher in the high-growth sample. One could be concerned that such high average was driven by some few outliers. However, this is not the case: underpricing was above 50 percent for near half of the high-growth sample and above 40 percent for 54 percent of the sample. It was below 20 percent for only 32 percent of the high-growth sample.
-Results
-Price spiral
Tables 5 presents estimations for Models 1 and 2 that test for a positive relation between the number (or proportion) of IPOs of high-growth firms and the variation of the return on NASDAQ composite index (Hypothesis 1). Regressions 1-6 analyses the bubble period.
Regressions 1-3 report analysis on rolling three-week returns while regressions 4-6 report results on weekly returns. Regression 1 includes only the variation on the NYSE composite index (ΔNYSE) and the total number of IPOs (#IPOs) in the period. As expected, the coefficient on ΔNYSE composite index is positive, near to one (0.948), although its statistical significance is only marginal (t-statistics is 1.77). The coefficient on #IPOs is virtually zero in magnitude and statistical significance. R-square coefficient is only 0.09. In Regression 2 we include also the mean sales growth of the IPOs during the equivalent period. Now both the coefficients on the numbers of IPOs and mean sales growth are marginally statistically significant. The coefficient for the number of IPOs is negative (-0.007, t-statistics is -1.95), while the coefficient for the mean sales growth is positive (0.001, t-statistics is 1.86). The coefficient on ΔNYSE loses statistical significance even though does not change much in value (t=1.62). R-square coefficient increases sharply to 0.23, showing a significant increase in the model's predictive power. Regressions 13-24 replicate specifications used in regressions 1-12 but using two different samples: The pre-bubble period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) and the transition period (1997-1998). As we can observe, throughout all these regressions, the only coefficient that is statistically significant it is the one for the variation on the NYSE composite index, indicating that only macroeconomic variations play a role in the movements of the NASDAQ index. Consequently, our results corroborate Hypothesis 1's statement that during the bubble, NASDAQ index responded to the flow of high-growth IPOs, a fact that it is not present in other adjacent periods.
-Underpricing in the bubble
Our Hypothesis 2 states that the high underpricing prevailing during the bubble is fully accounted by issuers' characteristics and strategic goals rather than underwriter's behavior. Table   6 investigates underpricing during the bubble (Model 2). Regression 1 includes only the usual controls plus the Bubble dummy.
7 The coefficient on the bubble dummy is 0. 358 (35.8 percent) with statistical significance at the one percent level. Thus the increase in underpricing during the 7 We do not include controls for the ex-ante demand because they could be correlated to the bubble itself.
16
bubble is not fully explained by change in firms' characteristics. Notice that the coefficients on the dummies for VC, Big-four, High-growth, Acquisition pre-IPO and Young are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level.
Regression 2 includes the interaction between top-underwriting and the bubble dummies.
Now the coefficient on the Bubble dummy drops to 0.249 that is significant at the one percent level. The coefficient on the interaction is 0.137 that is significant at the 10% level, suggesting that part of the underpricing incurred during the bubble was due to the action of top underwriters.
This result is similar to that of Loughran and Ritter (2004) . Regression 4 includes additionally the interaction between the bubble and Big-four dummy. The coefficient on such interaction is 0.217 that is statistically significant at the one percent level. Notice that now the coefficient on the bubble dummy becomes negative but still non-significant. The inclusion of this interaction does not change the magnitudes of the coefficients on the interactions of VC and Acquisition pre-IPO. 8 We note that these authors did not include in their analysis any other interaction with the bubble dummy.
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It is possible that our three strategic variables also have a selection component. For instance, VC-sponsored firms are frequently young, focused on technology and belong to highgrowth industries. In order to disentangle these two components, regression 5 includes interactions between the bubble dummy and the dummies three for firms' characteristics (highgrowth, technology and young). All of these interactions bear coefficients near 15 percent that are statistically significant at the five or 10 percent levels. Now the coefficient on the interaction of the bubble and VC dummies drops from 0.27 (Regressions 3 and 4) to 0.18, but remains statistically significant at the one percent level. This means that from the 27 percent extra underpricing bore by VC-sponsored firms, only 9 percent was due to their characteristics. The magnitude of the coefficient on the interactions between the Acquisition pre-IPO, Big-four and bubble dummies are only marginally affected by firms' characteristics, suggesting that the Acquisition pre-IPO and Big-four variables capture only strategic behavior.
Regression 6 drops the bubble dummy to include its interaction with the Non-top underwriting dummy. The coefficient on the interaction with the top-underwriting dummy becomes negative (-0.077) but still fails to present statistical significance (t-statistics is -1.13).
Regression 7, for robustness purposes, includes controls for the ex-ante demand (price revision up and price revision down). The coefficient on the bubble dummy becomes -0.173 that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on the interaction of the bubble and top-underwriting dummies remain positive but without statistical significance (t-statistics is 1.10).
Overall, our underpricing analysis indicates that the abnormal underpricing observed during the bubble was due mostly to firms' characteristics and their strategic behavior, corroborating Hypothesis 2. We find no evidence that such abnormal underpricing was driven by top-underwriters' actions.
-Robustness checks
-Risk Composition Hypothesis
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We will now discuss some robustness tests that consider alternative theories for the market's bubble behavior. We start with the Risk Composition hypothesis (RCH) that assumes that issuers' quality decreased during the bubble period. We now investigate changes in issuers' quality.
One of the main evidences supporting RCH is the increased rate of failure (delisting due to bankruptcy or drop reasons) within the first five years from the IPO (Yung, Colak and Wang; 2008) . We look at the evolution of failure rates along the years from the IPO (Table 7) .
Compared to the pre-bubble period, failure rate within three years from the IPO during the bubble is almost three times bigger: 14.7 vs. 5.3 percent (difference statistically significant at the one percent level). Within five years, it is almost twice: 18.6 vs. IPOs. Therefore, it is likely that the effect of macroeconomic shocks on failure rates is stronger for the bubble cohort. Summing up, there is no evidence of higher failure rates during the bubble in the long run. Table 7 also reports the difference in failure rates across highly and lowly underpriced IPOs during the bubble. If underpricing is related to drop in quality, highly underpriced IPOs should be associated increases failure rate. We find just the opposite. Failure rate remains five to seven percent lower for highly underpriced IPO regardless of the time horizon (difference always statistically significant at the one percent level). Thus, failure rate seems negatively related to underpricing.
We also look at other quality measures: bid-ask spreads at the end of the second year from the IPO and analysts' coverage at the end of the first year, and institutional ownership and its Herfindahl index at the end of the second year from the IPO ( Finally, we run regression analysis to search for drop in quality associated to issuers characteristics (Table 8 ). Initially we focus on VC-sponsorship. VC bubble firms were less frequently M&A targets, and they also experienced lower bid-ask spreads and institutional ownership. There was no relative change in failure rate, analysts' coverage and the Herfindhal index for institutional ownership. Therefore, VC-sponsorship at the bubble implies a higher liquidity and lower likelihood of becoming an M&A target. Thus, there is no evidence of a decrease in quality for VC-sponsored issuers. For pre-IPO acquirers there was increased likelihood of M&A, decreased bid-ask spreads and institutional concentration. Moreover, the failure among pre-IPO acquirers was so rare that the variable drops in failure regression.
Consequently, apart from some evidence of industry concentration, all results point to an increase in quality. For issuers with Big-four auditing there was decreased failure rate, improved analyst coverage and institutional ownership, and lower institutional concentration. These results point towards an improvement in quality.
The only groups of firms for which we see any evidence of decrease in quality are technology and high-growth firms. Evidence is stronger for technology firms: there was an increase in the rate of failure, even though they had improved their liquidity (lower bid-ask spreads and higher analysts' coverage). High-growth firms experienced a reduction in institutional ownership and an increase in its concentration. For both technology and highgrowth firms there was an indication of sector consolidation, with higher likelihood of becoming an M&A target.
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Contrary to what one could expect, there is no evidence of any change in quality for young issuers during the bubble. Issuers that went public earlier in their life cycle during the bubble were equally good as their predecessors. This result goes against the idea that during the bubble firms were speeding up their IPOs to time the market and exploit investors' gullibility.
Overall, the evidence of a decrease in the quality of issuers seems weak. In particular,
there is no evidence of deterioration in quality among VC-sponsored, acquiring, audited by Bigfour or young companies. This leaves little room for a demand-driven explanation for the high underpricing.
--Change in underwriters'' certification
Certification increased during the bubble (Table 4 ). The proportion of top underwriting increased from 68 to 84 percent (difference significant at the one percent level), and was much higher among highly underpriced IPOs: 87 vs. 81 percent (significant at the five percent level).
This led Loughran and Ritter (2004) to raise concern as top underwriting as measure of quality.
Accordingly, the increase in top-underwriting during the bubble was due to top underwriters' opportunistic behavior to increase market share. We address such concern by running probit analysis on the probability of top underwriting (Model 5). Regressions 1-3 in Table 9 report marginal effects. Regression 1 includes only predetermined characteristics of issues. Top underwriting is more likely for VC-sponsored, technology and large firms, and for large offerings (in terms of absolute and relative size). Regression 2 includes a dummy variable for the bubble period. The marginal effect of the bubble dummy is -0.160 (statistically significant at the one percent level). Thus, the likelihood of any firm hiring a top underwriter fell by 16.0 percent during the bubble. Finally, Regression 3 also controls for issuers' strategic goals. The marginal effect of the bubble dummy remains the same both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. In short, our results reject the idea of underwriters' opportunism. In fact, top underwriters became more selective. The increase in top underwriting during the bubble was due to the raise in the proportion of firms with the fit for it.
-Change in analysts' coverage
21 Loughran and Ritter (2004) suggest that during the bubble some firms coped with high underpricing to obtain analysts' coverage (Analyst Lust). We investigate such conjecture by running probit analysis on analysts' coverage (Model 5). Regressions 4-6 in Table 9 there is no evidence that during the bubble analyst coverage increased uniformly or that coverage was related to underpricing or top underwriting. Consequently, our results contradict the Analyst Lust conjecture.
-Conclusion
We conjecture that the Internet bubble and the concomitant high underpricing was consequence of the emergence of the Dotcom industry and its large cohort of firms racing for market leadership.
Our empirical findings support our conjecture. We begin by showing that during the bubble there was no decrease in the quality of the average issuer. In fact, there is indication that quality increased. For example, we find that the tradability conditions and certification improve during the bubble. Finally, in order to reconcile our result with the previous literature, we show that the increase in failure rate previously reported in the literature prevailed only in the shortrun. However, the mid-and long-run failure rates are not different for the bubble and pre-bubble IPO cohorts. Furthermore, we observe that highly underpriced firms presented better quality than their low-underpriced counterparts. Therefore, our evidence goes against the Risk Composition Hypothesis.
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By examining the determinants of top underwriting an analysts' coverage we found that underwriters and analysts became more selective during the bubble. Controlling for firms' characteristics, the likelihood of obtaining top underwriting fell by near 15 percent, while that of analysts' coverage fell by near three percent. Top underwriting and analysts' coverage increased during the bubble because of the increase in the proportion of firms with the fit for them. This evidence is contrary to the Analyst Lust Conjecture and to the idea that top underwriters took advantage of the moment to increase their market share.
Next, we show that the abnormally high underpricing observed during the bubble can be fully accounted by issuers' characteristics and strategic purposes. The strategic dimensions we consider were firms that were doing acquisitions, sought Big-four auditing, and had VC sponsorship. The issuers associated with high underpricing were high-growth, technology and young. When one controls for these characteristics, it emerges that the abnormally high underpricing is not related to underwriters' behavior. Thus our evidence is contrary to the
Realignment of Incentives Hypothesis.
We also checked for the possibility that investors forced high underpricing as a reaction to a decrease in quality for specific issuers. We did not find supporting evidence that firms with the characteristics associated to high underpricing presented decreased quality. The exception was technology firms that presented increased failure rates. Consequently, we do not find empirical support for the conjecture of a demand-driven high underpricing.
Finally, based on a model that controls for macroeconomic low-frequency shocks through the variation in NYSE composite index, we show that the number or proportion of highly underpriced IPOs explains large part of the variation on NASDAQ composite index. This result remains even if we proxy for the proportion of highly underpriced IPOs with the number of highgrowth IPOs, or the number of IPOs with predicted high underprice (predictions coming from a regression that includes only issue's predetermined characteristics). This result is robust to the estimation period used to predict underpricing.
Table 1 Variables Definition
Underpricing
The percent change from the IPO offer price to the closing price of the first trading day.
Acquisition post-IPO Dummy variable indicating that the firm made acquisitions in the 5-year period after the IPO.
Acquisition pre-IPO Dummy variable indicating that the firm made acquisitions in the 3-year period before the IPO.
Big-four auditing Dummy variable indicating whether financial statements were audited by Big-Four auditor Venture Capital (VC) Dummy variable indicating VC sponsorship.
M&A
Dummy variable indicating that the firm was target for merger or acquisition between 3 th and 10 th years from the IPO. Analysts' coverage Dummy variable indicating that the firms is followed by at least one analyst during the year Sales growth Geometric average of quarterly sales growth during the last three quarters before the IPO (or available period if less).
High-growth Dummy variable indicating that Sales growth was above the cut off for the top quartile using the sample from 1991-1996
Price revision up Dummy variable indicating that the offer price was higher than original filing high price.
Price revision down Dummy variable indicating that the offer price is lower than original filing low price. 
Table 4 Characteristics of Sample across Periods
Underpricing: first trading day closing price relative to the offer price; Age: IPO year minus founding year; Firm size: book value of assets in the last financial report before the IPO; Technology: dummy variable indicating technology industries as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004) ; Sales growth: geometric average of quarterly sales growth during the last three quarters before the IPO (or available period, if less); High-growth: dummy variable indicating quarterly sales growth above 100%; Offer size: filled amount in the IPO prospectus; and Top underwriting: dummy variable indicating that the Carter-Manaster index for the member of the underwriting syndicate with the highest score is bigger than 8. Number of firms with the attribute and tstatistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1percent levels (in boldface). The number or observations is 2,754. The dependent variables are Failure: dummy variable indicating delisting for bankruptcy of drop in the first 10 years from the IPO; M&A: dummy variable indicating that the firm was target for acquisition in the first 10 years from the IPO; Bid-ask: bid-ask spreads at the end of the second year from the IPO; Analysts: dummy variable indicating analysts coverage at the end of the second year from the IPO; Institutional ownership: Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors at the end of the second year from the IPO; and Herfindhal: Herfindhal index for institutional ownership at the end of the second year from the IPO. Explanatory variables are: Bubble dummy indicates the years of 1999 and 2000; Venture Capital: dummy variable indicating VC sponsorship; Acquisition pre-IPO: dummy variable indicating that the firm made acquisitions in the 3-year period before the IPO; Big-four auditing: dummy variable indicating auditing by Big-Four auditors; High-growth: dummy variable indicating quarterly sales growth above 100%; Technology: dummy variable indicating technology industries as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004) ; Young: dummy variable indicating if the firm is younger than 8.1 years old; Age: IPO year minus founding year; Firm size: book value of assets in the last financial report before the IPO; Offer size: filled amount in the IPO prospectus; and Sales growth: geometric average of quarterly sales growth during the last three quarters before the IPO (or available period if less). T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Estimates use White standard errors. We use *, ** and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels (two sided). The number or observations is 2,754. 
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